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ARTICLES
A CAUTIONARY TALE ABOUT POLICING PEACEFUL
PROTESTS: FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS STILL REIGN
SUPREME
KIA H. VERNON*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Forward together, not one step back! Forward together, not one step
back!" the crowd of thousands yelled as they marched from the Capitol
Lawn toward the North Carolina Legislative Building in Raleigh, North
Carolina.' The multitude of men and women, representing various races,
socioeconomic backgrounds, and ideological views,2 converged on the Cap-
itol Mall to participate in a "Moral Monday"3 demonstration, to protest nu-
merous legislations enacted by the North Carolina General Assembly relat-
ing to voter identification, unemployment benefits, Medicaid expansion,
* Kia H. Vernon is an assistant professor at North Carolina Central University School of Law
and also represented several Moral Monday protesters in district court in Wake County, North Carolina.
Professor Vernon would like to thank her research assistants, Abdul Roberts and Ashley Foxx for the
countless hours of research and assistance, and all of her colleagues, especially Professors Krishnce
Coley, Dorothy Nachman, Susan Hauser, Mary Wright, and Cheryl Amana, who provide daily motiva-
tion, encouragement and support. Finally, Professor Vernon would like to express her deepest gratitude
to Professors Irving Joyner and Scott Holmes, two of the lead attorneys for the Moral Monday Legal
Team, whose unwavering dedication, commitment, service, advocacy, and humility inspire her to do
more and to be greater.
1. NC Forward Together Moral Movement Channel, June 3rd Moral Monday Mass Rally Promo
- Forward Together Movement, YoUTUBE (May 30, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-
U5Hi3bXMVnc.
2. See NC Civitas Institute, The Moral Monday Protestors, http://www.nccivitas.org/
moralmonday/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2015) (Although there is no statistical information available regard-
ing protestor diversity, proportional representations by age, sex, political affiliations, reported cities and
counties and available salaries of arrestees can be found on this site).
3. See Ari Berman, North Carolina's Moral Mondays, NATION (July 17, 2013),
http://www.thenation.conarticlc/175328/north-carolinas-moral-mondays#. (Weekly protests, organized
by the North Carolina Chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NC
NAACP), began on Apr. 29, 2013. The demonstrations, called "Moral Monday" protests, were held on
Mondays, the beginning of the legislative work week, to encourage lawmakers to reverse some of the
laws and policies they enacted "that attack North Carolina's poorest and most vulnerable residents.").
105
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abortion rights, teacher pay, changes in tax legislation, and other issues
affecting poor and disadvantaged citizens in the State.4
While many in the crowd remained on the Capitol Lawn, others filed into
the North Carolina Legislative Building to continue their protest.5 Protes-
tors entering the public building filed in through the front doors, passing
reporters and police officers from various agencies.6 Some protestors con-
tinued to sing and chant, while others bowed their heads in silent prayer or
simply stood in solidarity.7 After several minutes of singing and chanting,
the group was addressed by Jeff Weaver, Chief of the North Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly Police, who announced that the group was engaged in an
unlawful assembly; the individuals would be arrested unless they dis-
persed.
What happened next presents a cautionary tale for those who are tasked
with the responsibility of writing, enacting, and ultimately policing the laws
that restrict an individual's freedom of speech, freedom to peaceably as-
semble, and right to petition the government for a redress of the individu-
al's grievances. After the police issued three warnings, protestors on the
first level of the building9 were arrested and charged with Failure to Dis-
perse,' Violation of Building Rules,'' and Second Degree Trespass.1 2 Pro-
testors were not informed of the nature of their "unlawful acts,".nor were
they asked to be quiet or provided instructions on how they could be in
compliance with the building rules and thus avoid arrest.' 3 Instead, immedi-
ately after the third warning, protestors were asked one-by-one to turn
around with their hands behind their backs so zip ties could be placed
around their wrists, as they were informed that they were being placed un-
der arrest. " The protestors were then led to a prison bus and driven past the
thousands of onlookers who cheered in their support as they were trans-
4. Interview with Irving Joyncr, Professor of Law at N.C. Cent. Univ. Sch. of Law and Chair of
the N.C. NAACP Legal Redress Team, in Durham, N.C. (Feb. 6, 2015) (Professor Joyncr was also
Defensc Team Coordinator for the North Carolina Moral Monday Movement, leading a group of over
100 volunteer attorneys who assisted in the representation of the over 900 Moral Monday arrestees).
5. Order Granting Dismissal of Charges, Sept. 14, 2014.
6. Id. Police officers from the North Carolina General Assembly, Raleigh Police Department and
Capitol Police Department were present.
7. Berman, supra note 3.
8. Id.
9. Protestors on the second level were allowed to remain and continue with their protest and were
not threatened with arrest.
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.5 (2013).
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-32.1(b) (2013). Protestors were charged with violating building rules
for displaying signs in violation of posted building rules. All protestors were charged for violating
building rules, regardless of whether the protestors were displaying a sign.
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-159.13 (2013).
13. Interview with Irving Joyner, supra note 4.
14. Id
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ferred to the nearby Wake County Justice Center so they could be pro-
cessed.L5
Over the course of the 2013 legislative session, thirteen Moral Monday
protests took place, bringing more than 35,000 concerned citizens together
to voice their concerns about the new direction of the North Carolina Legis-
lature. 16 At the end of the session, nearly 950 protestors were arrested for
what the protestors and rally organizers deemed to be an exercise of the
protestors' First Amendment rights.' 7 Despite efforts by attorneys for the
Moral Monday Movement to negotiate for the dismissal of all charges prior
to trial,' 8 the Wake County District Attorneyl 9 chose instead to proceed
with prosecuting each case, presenting arrested protestors with only two
options: 1) accept a deferred prosecution agreement, requiring each defend-
ant to perform twenty-five hours of community service at an approved or-
ganization, pay court costs in the amount of $180, and agree not to commit
any criminal offense other than waivable traffic violations, in exchange for
a voluntary dismissal of all charges; 2 0 or 2) proceed with a trial. 21
Although some protestors accepted the deferral agreement, the majority
of those arrested decided to challenge the constitutionality of the charges,22
asserting that they "were engaging in 'peaceful political speech' protected
under the U.S. Constitution."2 3 To accommodate the over 900 cases, the
North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts appointed a special
judge who was scheduled to oversee all of the Moral Monday Cases during
the two monthly court dates allocated for the trials. 2 4
15. Berman, supra note 3.
16. REV. DR. WILLIAM J. BARBER 11 (with BARBARA ZELTER), FORWARD TOGETHER, A MORAL
MESSAGE FOR THE NATION 4 (2015). Moral Monday Protests were also held in cities across North
Carolina. It is estimated that more than thirty thousand protestors attended those statewide events. Id.
17. Berman, supra note 3.
18. Interview with Irving Joyner, supra note 4.
19. See Kelly Gardner, Governor Appoints Wake judge as interim DA, http://www.wral.com/
governor-appoints-district-court-judge-as-interim-wake-da/13518670/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2015) (The
Wake County District Attorney at the time of the Moral Monday arrests was Colon Willoughby. Ned
Mangum was appointed as interim Wake County District attorney in March 2014.).
20. Sloane Heffernan, et. al., DA: Do comnmnunity service to discharge 'Moral Monday' arrests,
http://www.wral.com/wake-da-offers-deal-to-moral-monday-arrestees/12765874/ (last visited Mar. 12,
2015).
21. Id.
22. Of the nearly 1,000 arrests, only approximately two dozen accepted plea agreements. Anne
Blythe, Moral Monday Case Verdicts Vary, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Nov. 8, 2013, at IA.
23. Anne Blythe, 2 'Moral Monday' Cases Dismissed, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Oct. 12,
2013, at IB. (quoting Scott Holmes, one of the lead attorneys for the Moral Monday cases).
24. Jess Thomas, Moral Monday Protestor from N.C. State Faces Trial, TECHNICIAN ONLINE (Oct.
27, 2013, 11:55 PM), http://www.technicianonlinc.com/news/articlcb896ff30-3f84-l Ic3-8335-
0019bb30f31a.html.
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As the cases began to trickle through the court system, many began to
question the arrests and subsequent prosecutions of the protestors. 2 5 How
could protestors be arrested for exercising their constitutionally protected
rights? Were the protesters arrested in order to thwart future attempts by
individuals interested in exercising their right to peacefully assemble and
petition their representatives? Was the criminal justice system being used to
deter freedom of speech? What is the "cost" of attempts to legislate protest?
This Article will examine the issues relating to recent attempts by the
North Carolina General Assembly to regulate speech and limit an individu-
al's First Amendment right to protest. Part II of this Article will examine
the protections afforded to individuals exercising their rights to protest and
peaceably assemble under the First Amendment, as extended to the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment, and discuss the limitations on freedom of
speech and the right to assemble, including a discussion of time, place, or
manner restrictions and the limitation of speech in places designated as
public forums. Part III of this Article will discuss leading cases involving
freedom of speech. Part IV of this Article will discuss the Moral Monday
Movement in North Carolina and attempts by the North Carolina General
Assembly to limit protest and regulate freedom of speech by enacting and
enforcing statutes that criminalize protest. Part V will discuss the costs as-
sociated with attempts to limit and criminalize protest, and Part VI will
provide recommendations for individuals or entities charged with monitor-
ing freedom of speech to avoid infringing upon an individual's constitu-
tionally protected rights.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to peti-
tion the Government for a redress of grievances."26 Although the First
Amendment applies to interference from the federal government, these pro-
hibitions are extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.2
While the language in the First Amendment appears to imply that these
fundamental rights were only bestowed upon individuals by the Amend-
25. Because court cases were only scheduled for two days per month - with the first trial lasting
more than two days - moving the cases through the system was an extremely slow process. As protes-
tor Barbara Zclter opined, "with her schedule, it's going to take many years to complete all of the trials
involving the [Moral Monday] defendants." Id.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
27. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
4
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ment's enactment, it was well established - long before even the Constitu-
tion itself was written - that the ability "to meet peaceably for consultation
in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances" was
an inherent birthright of every citizen of the United States.28 As United
States Supreme Court Chief Justice Morrison Waite acknowledged in Unit-
ed States v. Cruikshank,29 "[t]he right of the people peaceably to assemble
for lawful purposes, with the obligation on the part of the States to afford it
protection, existed long before the adoption of the Constitution." 0 At the
very core of the creation of this democracy was the desire of the people of
the United States to develop a national government that would "'establish
justice, insure domestic tranquility ... promote the general welfare, and
,,3I
secure the blessings of liberty' to themselves and their posterity .... "
Even though it is well-known that the inalienable rights of freedom of
speech and peaceful assembly are liberties afforded to everyone, it is like-
wise recognized that these liberties are not absolute. 32 All speech is not pro-
tected and even protected speech can be limited. As the Court held in
Schenck v. United States,33 "[t]he character of every act depends upon the
circumstances in which it was done."34 Accordingly, in determining what
and when speech is protected and where an individual is legally allowed to
peacefully protest numerous factors will be considered.
Because there are so many cases involving attempts to prohibit speech,
formulating one general rule that applies to all speech is simply not possi-
ble. "[S]peech interacts with too many other values in too many complicat-
ed ways to expect that a single formula will prove productive." 3s Thus,
whether a particular speech is protected will depend on the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding each case. 36 As a result, limitations on speech have
been the subject of great debate, and therefore heavily litigated.
28. Id. at 552. See also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937) ("The greater the im-
portance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force
and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free
speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to
the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be
obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitu-
tional government.").
29. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
30. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
31. Id. at 549-50 (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
32. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
33. 249 U.S. 47(1919).
34. Id. at 52.
35. JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., LEADING CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 314 (West cd., 2010).
36. Id.
37. Id.
2015] 109
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The United States Supreme Court has provided guidance to lower courts
when analyzing whether certain types of speech are protected. In examining
freedom of speech limitations, the Court has held that certain categories of
speech do not fall under the protection of the First Amendment. In Chap-
linksy v. New Hampshire,38 the Court held that "[t]here are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punish-
ment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional prob-
lem." Among the types of speech that are not afforded constitutional pro-
tection are "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insult-
ing or 'fighting' words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."40
When examining the constitutionality of laws that regulate free speech,
the Court balances the importance of the rights with the interests that the
policies are seeking to serve. Accordingly, to analyze the regulations, it is
necessary to distinguish between content regulations and regulations of
conduct related to speech.4' Content restrictions refer to policies that are
enacted to prohibit or limit the speaker's message. 4 2 These restrictions in-
clude content-based regulations, when the government undertakes to regu-
late speech based on the subject matter or specific views expressed in the
message, and content-neutral regulations, when the government seeks to
regulate all speech for some other purpose.43
In order to justify content-based restrictions, the government must meet
the highest level of scrutiny and demonstrate that the regulation is neces-
sary to serve a compelling state interest and that the regulation is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.44 However, in justifying content-neutral re-
strictions, an intermediate level of scrutiny applies and the government
needs only to show that the regulation is necessary to advance important
interests unrelated to the suppression of speech, and that it does not burden
38. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
39. Id. at 571-72.
40. Id. at 572. See also Massess Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)
("The defendant's position, therefore, in so far as it involves the suppression of the free utterance of
abuse and criticism of the existing law, or the policies of the war, is not, in my judgment supported by
the language of the statute. Yet there has always been a recognized limit to such expressions, incident
indeed to the existence of any compulsive power of the state itself.").
41. CHOPER, supra note 35, at 414.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. See also Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 680 (1994) ("Content-
based speech restrictions arc generally unconstitutional unless they are narrowly tailored to a compelling
state interest." (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988))).
6
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substantially more speech than is necessary or are narrowly tailored to fur-
ther those interests.
Regulations that seek to prohibit speech must also be reasonable. A regu-
lation will not be upheld if it is overbroad, prohibits substantially more
speech than is necessary to serve its interest, it is vague, or it fails to pro-
vide reasonable notice of the type of speech that is prohibited or permit-
ted.4 6 Additionally, there must be defined standards for how the law is to be
applied.47 A public official cannot be afforded unfettered discretion in the
enforcement of the law.48
In regulating the conduct pertaining to free speech, the Court has allowed
even more governmental latitude, permitting the government to adopt time,
place, and manner regulations.49 When speech is made on property that is a
public forum (government property that the government is constitutionally
required to make available for speech),o or a designated public forum
(government property that the government could close to speech, but in-
stead chooses to open the property to speech for a specific use or period of
time),5' the government may use time, place, and manner restrictions to
regulate speech.5 2 However, the regulation must be content-neutral, or it
must meet the highest level of scrutiny and be necessary to serve a compel-
45. City of Renton v. Playtime Thcatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) ("The appropriate inquiry in
this case, then, is whether the Renton ordinance is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest
and allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication."). See also Clark v. Community for
Crcative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1980). It is clear that the ordinance meets such a standard. As a majority of the
Court recognized in American Mini Theatres, a city's 'interest in attempting to preserve the quality of
urban life is one that must be accorded high respect.' Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71
(1976) (plurality opinion); see id. at 80 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Nor is there doubt that the interests
furthered by this ordinance are both important and substantial."). Exactly the same vital govermental
interests are at stake here.
46. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 685 (1968).
47. Id. at 677.
48. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965) ("It is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public
official to determine which expressions of view will be permitted and which will not or to engage in
invidious discrimination among persons or groups either by use of a statute providing a system of broad
discretionary licensing power or, as in this case, the equivalent of such a system by selective enforce-
ment of an extremely broad prohibitory statute."). See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560-61 (1938).
49. Clark, 468 U.S. 288, 293-94 (1984) ("Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by
conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place or manner restrictions. We have often noted that restrictions
of this kind are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave
open amplc alternative channels for communication of the information); see also City Council of LA v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 815 (1984); U.S. v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647; Va. Pharmacy
Board v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980).
50. Perry, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
51. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981).
52. Id. at 276; See also Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
2015] 1I11
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ling state interest, and narrowly tailored to serve that interest.53 If the regu-
lation is content-neutral it must be a time, place, and manner restriction that
is narrowly tailored to serve an important governmental interest and leaves
open alternative channels for communication. 54
When a property is a limited public forum (a government property that
the government opens to some speakers or some topics), the government
can regulate speech as long as the regulation is reasonable and viewpoint-
neutral.5s Likewise, if a property is designated as a non-public forum, a
government property that the government can - and does - close to
speech, the government can regulate speech as long as the regulation is
reasonable and viewpoint neutral.
III. CASES ADDRESSING FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
Despite the guidelines provided by the United States Supreme Court,
governmental regulations and other attempts to prohibit, limit, or penalize
speech are pervasive.5 7 However, despite continued attempts to limit these
fundamental rights, the Court has consistently affirmed that governmental
agencies cannot infringe upon an individual's right to exercise those
rights.58 When the speech is constitutionally protected speech that takes
place in a public forum or designated public forum, the Court has generally
held that, although the speech may be protected, the government is allowed
to establish appropriate limitations to protect its governmental interest.59
In Edwards v. South Carolina," the United States Supreme Court exam-
ined the restriction of speech in a public forum. ' In Edwards, 187 high
school and college students gathered at the South Carolina State House
grounds to protest racially discriminatory practices.62 As they approached
the State House grounds, they encountered thirty law enforcement officers,
53. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 ("In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been
devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are sharply circum-
scribed ... In these quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all communicative
activity. For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary
to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.) (citing Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
54. Id.
55. USPS v. Council ofGreenburgh, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981).
56. Id. at 132-33.
57. See, e.g., id. at 116-17.
58. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 59-60 (1976).
59. As the focus of this article is the North Carolina Moral Monday Movement, for the purposes of
this article, the cases and subsequent discussion will be limited to content-neutral speech in public
formms.
60. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 229.
8
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who had received notice that the students had planned to engage in pro-
test.63 The students were advised that they could go through the State House
Grounds, but were required to do so peacefully, which they did.6 Nonethe-
less, after hundreds of onlookers began to crowd around, the students were
warned that if they did not disperse within fifteen minutes, they would be
arrested. Instead of complying with the order to disperse, the students
began to sing and chant, and were arrested and consequently convicted of
violating a South Carolina breach of the peace statute."66 The South Caroli-
na Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. The United States Supreme
Court, in reversing the convictions, held the students' peaceful assembly at
the site of state government, without the protestors themselves being vio-
lent, or threatening violence or harm, was an infringement of the constitu-
tionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to peti-
tion the government for redress of their grievances. 6 8 The Court further
provided that "[a] statute which upon its face, and as authoritatively con-
strued, is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use
of this opportunity is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment... .
In 1965, two years after Edwards, the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed the regulation of protected speech on state grounds in Cox v. Loui-
siana.70 In Cox, the defendant, B. Elten Cox, an ordained minister who led a
group of students to protest against segregation and discrimination in a
march from the Louisiana State Capitol Building to the courthouse, was
arrested and convicted under a disturbing the peace statute and violating a
state statute for obstructing public passages.7 1 At the end of the assembly
that consisted of singing, chanting, and praying, Mr. Cox encouraged the
demonstrators to protest racial discrimination by walking into stores that
served lunch and request to be served.72 If the demonstrators were not
served, they were instructed to sit for an hour.73 Thereafter, the demonstra-
tors were approached by the sheriff, who informed them that Mr. Cox's
appeal for them to engage in acts of civil disobedience in stores resulted in
the assembly being unlawful, and a direct violation of the law, and all de-
63. Id. at 230.
64. Id. at 230-31.
65. Id. at 233.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 234.
68. Id. at 237-38.
69. Id. at 238 (citing Strombcrg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
70. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 542-43.
73. Id. at 543.
2015] 113
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monstrators were required to leave at once.74 The demonstrators did not
immediately leave which prompted the police to explode a tear gas shell at
the group.75 This caused most of the protestors to quickly disperse, but the
defendant, as the organizer of the event, was one of the last individuals to
disperse. 76 The defendant was charged and convicted of violating the Loui-
siana State Statute which provided that
"[w]hoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace ... crowds or
congregates with others ... in or upon . . . a public street or public high-
way, or upon a public sidewalk, or any other public place or building . . .
and who fails or refuses to disperse and move on ... when ordered so to
do by any law enforcement officer. . . or any other authorized person ...
shall be guilty of disturbing the peace."
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed Cox's conviction, and Mr. Cox
appealed.
In reversing the defendant's conviction for breach of peace, the United
States Supreme Court held that the State could not constitutionally punish
the defendant for "engaging in the type of conduct which [the] record re-
veals . . . ,79 The Court asserted that the demonstrators were engaged in a
peaceful demonstration, which was protected by the Constitution.8 0 The
Court further held that the statute was unconstitutionally broad in scope as
it "sweeps within its broad scope activities that are constitutionally protect-
ed free speech and assembly."8' The Court added that "[m]aintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion is a basic tenet of our constitutional
democracy."82 Quoting Chief Justice Hughes in Stromberg v. Cahifornia,83
the Court reiterated that "[a] statute which upon its face, and as authorita-
tively construed, is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of
the fair use of this opportunity is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty con-
tained in the Fourteenth Amendment."84
The Court also reversed the defendant's conviction for obstructing pas-
sages as the statute provides unfettered discretion to the public official. 85
The Court held,
74. Id.
75. Id. at 544.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 536.
79. Id. at 545.
80. Id. at 549-51.
81. k. at 552.
82. Id.
83. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
84. Cox, 379 U.S. at 552.
85. Id. at 557-58.
10
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"[i]t is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to determine
which expressions of view will be permitted and which will not or to en-
gage in invidious discrimination among persons or groups either by use of
a statute providing a system of broad discretionary licensing power or, as
in this case, the equivalent of such a system by selective enforcement of
an extremely broad prohibitory statute." 86
In Occupy Columbia v. Haley,87 the Fourth Circuit also addressed im-
permissible regulation in public forums. In Occupy Columbia, the defend-
ants engaged in a twenty-four hour per day protest on the grounds of the
South Carolina General Assembly.88 After thirty-one days of continuous
occupation, South Carolina Governor, Nikki Haley, issued a letter to the
Director of the Department of Public Safety and to the Chief of Police of
the Bureau of Protective Services, advising them to arrest any individual
who remained on the state grounds after 6:00 p.m. without written authori-
zation from the Budget and Control Board. In her letter authorizing the
arrest, Governor Haley referred to a "Condition for Use of South Carolina
State House Grounds" provision that stated that, "no activities would be
scheduled after 5:00 p.m. in the State House and on the state grounds after
6:00 p.m. without written authorization from the Board."90 Later that day,
Governor Haley held a press conference announcing the policy. At 6:00
p.m. that evening nineteen protestors, who referred to themselves as Occu-
py Columbia, remained on the state grounds. Police arrested the protesters
and released them the following morning.91
Although the state dismissed charges against the nineteen individuals,
two weeks later the individuals filed suit to enjoin Governor Haley, and
other governmental actors, from interfering with their twenty-four hour
access to the state grounds.92 The court granted a preliminary injunction in
favor of the occupiers and after several amended complaints and cross-
complaints, which included a claim for damages by the occupiers and a
qualified immunity argument by the defendants, the South Carolina District
Court concluded that the defendants were entitled to occupy the state
grounds. The court held the rules that existed at the time of the arrest did
not include valid time, place, and manner restrictions that would preclude
86. Id.
87. 738 F. 3d 107 (4th Cir. 2013).
88. Id. at 112.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 112-13.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
2015] 115
11
Vernon: A Cautionary Tale about Policing Peaceful Protests: First Amendme
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2015
116 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:105
the plaintiffs' occupation. 94 The court also rejected the qualified immunity
arguments by Governor Haley and other defendants.95
In affirming the district court's ruling that the defendants violated the
plaintiffs' First Amendment Rights, the court reaffirmed its holding from
Tobey v. Jones,96 that "[a] bedrock First Amendment principle is that citi-
zens have a right to voice dissent from government policies . .. [and]
speech regarding "matters of public concern . .. is at the heart of the First
Amendment's protection." 9 7 However, the court recognized that even pro-
tected speech was not permissible in all places and at all times, and that
governments may enforce appropriate time, place, and manner restrictions
that are content-neutral and that are narrowly tailored to serve an important
governmental interest, and leave open alternative channels for communica-
tion. Nonetheless, at the time the arrests were made, there were no time,
place, and manner restrictions prohibiting the occupiers' overnight presence
on the state grounds, and thus the plaintiffs were entitled to be present on
the grounds, and the denial of that right was unconstitutional.
Most recently, the United States Supreme Court examined time, place,
and manner restrictions in McCullen v. Coakley,'oruling that
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or
manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tai-
lored to serve a significant public interest, and that they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.Iol
In McCullen, the plaintiffs questioned the constitutionality of a statute that
made it a crime to "knowingly stand on a public way or sidewalk within
thirty-five feet of an entrance or driveway to any place, other than a hospi-
tal, where abortions are performed."' 02 The defendants alleged that the law
was necessary because the previous statute establishing an "18-foot radius
around the entrances and driveways of [abortion clinics]" was inade-
quate.'o3 Plaintiffs challenged the statute, alleging that it infringed upon
their First Amendment Rights.'1 In ruling that the statute was unconstitu-
94. Id. at 114-115.
95. Id. at 115.
96. 706 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2013).
97. Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F. 3d 107, 122 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoted in Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 477 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985)).
98. See id. at 122.
99. Id. at 125.
100. 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
101. Id. at 2529.
102. Id. at 2525.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2528.
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tional, the Court concluded that in order for a content-neutral time, place, or
manner restriction to be narrowly tailored, "it must not burden substantially
more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate inter-
ests."105 In order to prevent the exclusion of areas open for speech and de-
bate, the content-neutral "restriction of speech need not be the least restric-
tive or least intrusive means of serving the government's interest." 06 How-
ever, the government still "may not regulate expression in such a manner
that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance
its goals." 0 7
These cases reflect that in spite of the numerous challenges testing the
constitutionality of regulations restricting speech in public forums, the law
and the United States Supreme Court's position remains the same: an indi-
vidual's right to access in a public forum is vital and deserves the utmost
protection. os
IV. A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA MORAL
MONDAY MOVEMENT
Similar to the other First Amendment cases, the Moral Monday protests
were not organized and effectuated to challenge the constitutionality of
existing regulations that attempted to thwart free speech. The protestors that
gathered did so to engage in what they understood, and the Court provided
in Edwards, to be constitutionally protected rights.'09 In defending his right
to protest, N.C. National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-
ple (NAACP) President, Reverend William Barber, one of the first protes-
tors to be arrested at the North Carolina General Assembly, declared that
the General Assembly was the "People's House.""o Protestors "went in to
challenge what we believed then, and believe now, are constitutionally in-
consistent, morally indefensible and economically insane extremist poli-
cies" such as requiring individuals to show a form of identification in order
105. Id. at 2535 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2540.
109. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. at 235 ("The circumstances in this case reflect an exer-
cisc of these basic constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form. The petitioners felt ag-
grieved by laws of South Carolina, which allegedly 'prohibited Negro privileges in this State.' They
peaceably assembled at the site of the State Government and there peaceably expressed their grievances
'to the citizens of South Carolina, along with the Legislative Bodies of South Carolina."). See also Anne
Blythe, Wake DA agrees to dismiss all but about 50 'Moral Monday' cases from 2013, News and Ob-
server (Sept. 19, 2014), available at http://www.newsobscrver.com/news/politics-government/state-
politics/articelOO65071.html (a discussion of the reasons the protestors decided to engage in protest and
why they asserted their actions were constitutional).
110. Interview with Irving Joyner, supra note 4.
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to vote, decreasing unemployment benefits and restricting abortion
rights."'
The leaders in the N.C. NAACP, having an established history of engag-
ing in protest to further the advancement of its causes, were no strangers to
the minutiae of protest and free speech protections, and laws that apply to
them.'12 Given this experience, NAACP leaders properly counseled indi-
viduals prior to engaging in the Moral Monday demonstrations.H 3 These
meetings were a valuable component of the Moral Monday Movement, as
they successfully prevented the escalation of protests and ensured that the
message, not the method, was the focus of the movement.' 14 In the meetings
held prior to the Moral Monday protests, organizers informed protestors of
the types of speech and conduct that were protected by the First Amend-
ment.115 Protestors were cautioned that the group intended to engage in only
nonviolent protest, thus the organizers strongly discouraged protestors from
participating in behavior that would run afoul of the Constitution and the
organization's ultimate goal."'6 As a precautionary measure - even though
the group solely intended to engage in activities that it believed were consti-
tutionally protected - protestors were advised of the possibility of arrest
and provided instruction on how to respond in the event that they were ar-
rested.17 Protestors who could not adhere to the rules were asked not to
participate." 8
Upon entering the North Carolina Legislative Building, protestors filed in
singing and chanting, while others carried signs in support of their various
causes."'9 Despite adhering to the parameters provided by the N.C. NAACP
to avoid engaging in speech and conduct not protected under the Constitu-
tion, Chief Weaver informed protestors that their assembly was unlawful,
and after advising them to leave three times, instructed the other officers to
secure the area and begin the process for arrest.120
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (noting that similar meetings, described as training programs, were held during the Civil
Rights Movement, where organizers held sit-in simulations were conducted to prepare protestors that
intended to engage in acts of civil disobedience).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. (noting that similar meetings, described as training programs, were held during the Civil
Rights Movement, where organizers held sit-in simulations were conducted to prepare protestors that
intended to engage in acts of civil disobedience).
118. Id.
119. Ari Berman, North Carolina's Moral Mondays, NATION (July 17, 2013), http://
www.thenation.com/article/1 75328/north-carolinas-moral-mondays#.
120. Id.
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Protestors were subsequently arrested and charged with violating build-
ing rules and crimes associated with their failure to disperse after the de-
termination was made that the assembly violated building rules.121 Howev-
er, there were several fatal flaws with the building rules.1 22 First, Chief
Weaver based his declaration that the group's assembly was an unconstitu-
tional violation because it was creating a disturbance.123 He relied on the
North Carolina General Assembly Legislative Building Rules (Legislative
Building Rules) to order the protestors to leave. These rules provided that
with limited exceptions,1 2 4 visitors on the second floor "may move freely
about the Legislative Complex, so long as they do not disturb the General
Assembly, one of its houses, or its committees, members, or staff in the
performance of their duties." 2 5 However, Chief Weaver was unable to ar-
ticulate an objective standard for how that determination was made.1 26 At
trial, Chief Weaver testified that the crowd was a disturbance, even though
there were no established standards to determine what would amount to a
disturbance, and he could not recount specific instances of being informed
by individual legislators or staff that the group actually disturbed anyone in
the General Assembly in the performance of their duties.1 27
121. Order Granting Dismissal of Charges, supra note 5 (The author notes that the charges of Sec-
ond Degree Trespass and Failure to Disperse both arise from the assertion that the Chief Weaver's basis
for determining that the assembly was unlawful was proper. Accordingly, this portion of the article will
focus specifically on why the protestor's activities were constitutionally protected, and thus the pro-
nouncement was inaccurate, which would result in the subsequent charges being declared invalid).
122. N.C. GEN. ASSEMB., RESTATED RULES OF STATE LEGISLATIVE BUILDING (May 15, 2014) (The
Legislative Building Rules in effect at the time of the Moral Monday protests were amended in 1987. In
light of the Moral Monday Protests and subsequent rulings, these rules were amended on January 13,
2015.). See Additional Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions for use of 2nd Floor Rotunda of Legisla-
tive Building, available at http://www.ncleg.net/ncgainfo/rotundaMcmo.pdf. See Rules of State Legisla-
tive Building and Legislative Office Building Adopted by the Legislative Services Commission, availa-
ble at http://www.ncga.state.nc.uslncgainfo/BuildingRules5-15-2014.pdf (The Legislative Rules are
promulgated by the Legislative Services Commission which is composed of House and Senate members
appointed by the President Pro Tern of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House.). The author notes that
during the Moral Monday cases, defense attorneys questioned the constitutionality of the method by
which the Commission promulgates the rules and the authority of the Commission to enact rules that can
result in criminal charges. However, the constitutionality of the structure of the commission and the
manner in which it promulgates rules is beyond the scope of this article.
123. Order Granting Dismissal of Charges, supra note 5, at 5.
124. Id. (The author notes during the first Moral Monday trials, Judge Hamilton ruled that the
portion of the Legislative Building Rules that limited access to the second floor of the Legislative Com-
plex based on the sole discretion of the members or staff was arbitrary and unconstitutional. Additional-
ly, even after the North Carolina General Assembly Police were on notice that the protestors intended to
engage in weekly protests and were aware that future Moral Monday protestors would engage in the
same activities, the protestors were allowed to come in to the Legislative complex, with the full
knowledge of their intent to engage in peaceful protest. This provides further evidence that the protes-
tors were in a public forum and protected under the Constitution.).
125. Id. at 6.
126. Id.
127. Order Granting Dismissal of Charges, supra note 5, at 8 (The author notes that she was present
during numerous Moral Monday trials challenging the constitutionality of Chief Weaver's determination
15
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As the United States Supreme Court held in Cox, such unbridled discre-
tion in a public official is "clearly unconstitutional." 2 8 As the Court further
stated, "appropriate, limited discretion, under properly drawn statutes or
ordinances . .. may be vested in administrative officials, provided that such
limitation is exercised with uniformity of method of treatment . . [and with]
a systematic, consistent and just order of treatment ... 129 In the Moral
Monday cases, no such method was employed, or even considered that
would allow Chief Weaver to consistently determine what conduct was
sufficient to be classified as a disturbance and to do so in a "systematic,
consistent and just order of treatment" as required by the Court in Cox.' 30
Further, the rule prohibiting "disturbances" in the Legislative Complex was
vague and overly broad as it provided no guidance for when and what
speech would violate it.' 3 ' As such, Chief Weaver's declaration that the
assembly was unlawful because it caused a disturbance was unconstitution-
al.1 32
Another fatal flaw in the building rules was the failure to provide appro-
priate time, place, or manner restrictions. The protestors were engaged in
constitutionally protected speech in a public forum. As the United States
Supreme Court has acknowledged, even though speech may be protected, it
is not protected unconditionally.' 33 Governmental agencies have the power
to create appropriate time, place, or manner restrictions.1 34 However, the
North Carolina Legislative Commission neglected to do so.1" The Legisla-
tive Building Rules in effect at the time of the Moral Monday protests
simply provided that the Legislative Complex was open to the public with-
out appropriate restrictions.1 36 As such, the protestors were engaging in
activities that were consistent with the protections afforded to them under
the Constitution. 13 7 Analogous to the circumstances in Occupy Columbia, at
the time of the initial Moral Monday protests, there were no time, place, or
manner restrictions pertaining to the protest in the Legislative Complex.
that the assembly was unlawful. Further, during several Moral Monday protests, the North Carolina
General Assembly was not in session, yet the protestors were still arrested based on Chief Weaver's
determination that they were causing a disturbance.).
128. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557. See also Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S.
147, 89 (1969) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance which makes peaceful enjoyment of freedoms
guaranteed by the Constitution contingent upon uncontrolled will ofan official).
129. Cox, 379 U.S. at 557.
130. Id.
131. Order Granting Dismissal of Charges, supra note 5, at 6.
132. Id. at 9.
133. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
134. Id.
135. See generally Order Granting Dismissal of Charges, supra note 5; State v. Becghlcy, app. A
(2013).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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The Legislative Building Rules were subsequently amended to include
time, place, and manner restrictions. The new rules cannot retroactively
apply to conduct that occurred prior to the amendment.' 39 Therefore, as the
Fourth Circuit held in Haley, "the right of the protesters to assemble and
speak out against the government on the State House grounds in the ab-
sence of valid time, place, and manner restrictions" was consistent and
clearly established in its prior rulings.1 4 0
Even if appropriate time, place, or manner restrictions were in effect at
the time of the protests, the subsequent arrests of the protestors would still
have been invalid. Time, place, and manner restrictions imposed by the
government "must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant public inter-
est, and must leave open ample alternative channels for communication of
the information." 4 1 During the Moral Monday protests, the protestors were
only informed that they had to disburse. 142 They were not advised on what
specific activity made the assembly unlawful or asked to reduce their noise
level. 14 3 The recent McCullen decision, which eventually resulted in the
dismissal of most of the Moral Monday cases, requires the government to
use its available resources to employ less restrictive methods to accomplish
its goals.'" This requirement is to be satisfied without prohibiting individu-
als from engaging in speech in areas open to them to do so.14s Furthermore,
the conduct of each individual, and not the group as a whole, should be
considered.1 4 6 In Moral Monday cases, all protestors were charged with
violating the same conduct, even though all protestors were not engaged in
that conduct.1 47 As attorney Scott Holmes argued while defending Moral
Monday protestors, "you can't use a bulldozer and clear everybody out of a
public forum when only a few people are causing a disturbance."' Ironi-
138. N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, RESTATED RULES OF STATE LEGISLATIVE BUILDING (May
15, 2014).
139. Id.
140. Occupy Columbia v. Halcy, 738 F. 3d 107, 125 (4th Cir. 2013). See generally Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
141. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984); Members of City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806 (1984).
142. See Interview with Irving Joyner, supra note 4.
143. Id.
144. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2549, 2552.
145. Id. at 2531.
146. Id. at 2547.
147. See Order Granting Dismissal of Charges, supra note 5. (For example, protestors charged with
violating building rules for carrying signs and engaging in unlawful conduct by singing and chanting,
although videos clearly showed the clients were not displaying signs, singing or chanting).
148. Anne Blythe, Judge's Ruling to Dismiss "Moral Monday" Cases Could Have Sweeping Effect,
NEWS & OBSERVER, Aug. 3, 2014, http://www.charlottcobscrvcr.com/ncws/politics-govcrnmcntl
articlc9146807.html.
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cally, Chief Weaver issued a memorandum on May 13, 2013 - two weeks
after the initial protests, but well before McCullen was decided - which
advised individuals that persons engaged in activity deemed to violate the
building rules would be informed of the rules they were violating, and
asked to cease those behaviors, before facing arrest.1 4 9 Under McCullen, the
guidelines specified in Chief Weaver's memorandum would have properly
advised and informed the protestors how to comply with the order and the
precise actions that could be taken in order to prevent arrest.150 However,
these procedures were never followed.' 51
Ultimately, and perhaps, most importantly, the greatest flaw with the
building rules was that they sought to prevent the communication that is
essential in a democratic system. Promulgating rules to discourage individ-
uals from petitioning the government and seeking their representatives is
not only unconstitutional, but it fails to produce the outcome it attempts to
achieve, to prohibit the protest. After the arrest and treatment of the initial
protestors, news media from around the state and nation generated massive
publicity for the Moral Monday Movement. 152 Instead of discouraging pro-
test, the arrests encouraged more protest and increased the number of pro-
test supporters. 13 Moreover, the North Carolina General Assembly's reac-
tionary measures served as a catalyst that motivated others to join the pro-
testors; some joined to protest the policies of the North Carolina General
Assembly, while others became involved simply to protest the violation of
the protestors' constitutional rights.' 54 Regardless of why they came, the
effort to stifle the protest produced the converse result. 55 As Professor Ir-
ving Joyner, professor of law at North Carolina Central University School
of Law and Chair of the N.C. NAACP Legal Redress Team, stated,
"[a]ttempts to deter protest will invariably result in people resisting those
attempts, which ultimately produces a more vigorous response."' 5 6
In contrast, when protestors were afforded a meaningful opportunity to
speak to representatives about their concerns, a peaceful exchange resulted
149. See Order Granting Dismissal of Charges, supra note 5.
150. Id.; see generally McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
151. See Order Granting Dismissal ofChargcs, supra note 5.
152. Kelly Gardner & Bridget Whclan, Moral Monday Crowd Rallies for Women's Rights; 101
Arrested, Jul. 14, 2013, http://www.wral.com/-moral-mondaycrowd-rallies-for-women-s-rights-/
12661852/. See also Andy Kotch, North Carolina Moral Monday Movement, PROGRESIVO, https://
progresivoblog.wordpress.com/north-carolinas-moral-monday-movement/.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Interview with Irving Joyner, supra note 4.
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without any arrests.157 When Moral Monday protestors requested - and
were granted - an opportunity to speak with Senate President Pro Tem,
Phil Berger, it provided for the exact exchange that the Constitution intend-
ed to encourage and safeguard.' 5 8 The protestors, who had initially planned
to stage a sit-in, instead left feeling that their concerns were at least
heard.1 59 One has to question why the North Carolina General Assembly
continued to employ the same tactics during subsequent Moral Monday
protests, instead of working with Moral Monday leaders to provide a forum
for them to appropriately address their concerns. The failure to appropriate-
ly respond and provide the access should be a valuable lesson to heed.
V. THE PRICE OF LIMITING AND CRIMINALIZING PROTEST
The Moral Monday Movement illustrates the substantial monetary costs
associated with attempts to regulate protest and then subsequently arrest,
charge and prosecute individuals for violating those regulations. Although
only fifty protestors participated in the first Moral Monday inside the North
Carolina Legislative Building, the arrest of the seventeen protestors gar-
nered local and national media exposure.160 As a result, the number of pro-
testors and arrestees increased the following week and continued to grow
each week the protests were held.' 6 ' As the number of individuals protest-
ing inside the Legislative Building grew, the number of supporters and op-
ponents that converged on the Capitol Mall greatly multiplied as well.1 6 2
Anticipating the large crowds, the North Carolina General Assembly Po-
lice, in addition to utilizing all of its officers, enlisted other local agencies
to provide additional police presence and support, causing unnecessary,
additional expenses and an inefficient use of state resources.
The volume of protestor arrests also placed a tremendous strain on the
City-County Bureau of Investigation (CCBI) and the Wake County Magis-
157. Mark Binker & Laura Leslie, Berger Talks Education with 'Moral Monday' Protesters, Article
to @NCCapitol, WRAL.COM (updated June II, 2014), http://www.wral.com/berger-talks-education-
with-moral-monday-protesters/13715714/.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. McClatchy News Serv., NAACP President, 16 Other Protestors Arrested Outside N.C. Senate,
Article to Region/State, THETIMESNEWS.COM (April 30, 2013, 08:44 AM), http://
www.thetimesnews.com/news/region-state/naacp-president- I 6-other-protestors-arrested-outside-n-c-
senate-1. 135124?page=0.
161. On May 6, 2013, more than 100 people filed into the North Carolina Legislative Building and
more than 30 people were arrested. Lynn Bonner, 30 Arrested While Protesting Laws They Say Hurt
Poor, Children, NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh), May 6, 2013.For a list of the number of arrests of each
Moral Monday protest, see https://progresivoblog.wordpress.com/north-carolinas-moral-monday-
movement/.
162. Interview with Irving Joyner, supra note 4.
163. Id.
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trate's Office.' As the number of arrestees increased, the costs associated
with processing the arrestees required additional CCBI staff, officers, and
magistrates, that became financially unsustainable.1 6 5 As such, the entities
were forced to modify their normal protocols for processing arrestees. 166 As
Former Wake County District Attorney Colon Willoughby stated in re-
sponse to criticism about the procedural changes, "We have limited court
resources that we're trying to properly allocate and be good stewards, and
(the Moral Monday arrests) are putting a severe burden on (the resources),
and I'm trying to figure out how to deal with it."' 67
In addition to the burdens placed on the government entities tasked with
processing the arrestees, the process of trying more than 900 cases was
costly and inefficient. 168 District Attorney Willoughby estimated that it
would take a year for a District Court judge to hear and rule on the cases. 6 9
Despite protestors coming from across the state and other parts of the coun-
try, the Wake County Court System was forced to bear the costs of adjudi-
cating all the cases.1 70 In order to accommodate the additional load of cases,
The North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) appointed
two retired Wake County District Court Judges to hear the cases and rule on
administrative matters. 17 1 Even though the majority of cases were ultimate-
ly dismissed after only forty trial dates, the AOC paid more than $17,000
for the judges alone.1 72 The actual costs far surpassed the amount the Wake
County District Attorney's Office assigned special Assistant District Attor-
neys to prosecute the cases.173 Further, the North Carolina General Assem-
bly continued to incur additional costs as the Chief of Legislative Assembly
Police, Jeff Weaver, and his Lieutenant, Martin Brock, were both required
to be present during all court trials.1 74 This resulted in countless hours spent
164. Id.
165. Amanda Lamb & Kelly Gardner, 'Moral Mondays' Forcing Changes in Wake Arrest Proce-
dures, Article to @NCCapitol, WRAL.CoM (June 25, 2013), http://www.wral.com/-moral-mondays-
forcing-changes-in-how-wakc-proccsses-arrests/12594377/.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. (The estimate does not take into account the continued strain on the system as the appeals
for those found guilty began to trickle through the appeals process.).
170. Id. ("It's a tremendous amount of resources when we're struggling to try to get drunken-
driving cases and domestic violence cases and violent juveniles processed through the District Court,"
[Willoughby] said. "It's a tremendous imposition on them, and it's being felt only by Wake County. The
other 99 counties don't bear this burden.").
171. Anne Blythe, Moral Monday Case Verdicts Vary, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Nov. 8,2013,
at IA, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-govemment/state-politics/
articlelO065071.html.
172. Id.
173. Interview with Irving Joyner, supra note 4.
174. Id.
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sitting in court, requiring the North Carolina General Assembly Police to
pay for additional officers to work in their absence.'" 5
Protestors also suffered considerably due to the Legislative Assembly's
attempt to regulate, and subsequently criminalize, their attempts to exercise
their constitutionally protected rights. In spite of the fact that most protes-
tors were provided with legal representation free of charge,"'76 individuals,
nevertheless, incurred costs due to numerous days taken off work to appear
for court dates, only to learn their cases were continued.'" As many of the
protestors did not live in Wake County, they incurred costly travel expenses
because they were required to appear in court, even when it was obvious
that their cases would not be heard.'78 Even those protestors, who opted to
avoid the additional inconvenience of traveling to Raleigh for trial by ac-
cepting the deferred prosecution agreements, were forced to pay court costs
and fines.' 7 9 This resulted in not only a financial burden, but added incalcu-
lable nonmonetary penalties due to their arrest, including the inability to
obtain employment due to their record of arrest and psychological conse-
quences from being placed under arrest.
The costs outlined above are in no way exhaustive. Additional factors,
including attorney's fees to counsel, the agencies enforcing the regulations,
and the agencies opposing them also increased the costs of the protestors.
The costs, however, do adequately demonstrate that the attempts to unrea-
sonably regulate protest have financial and other pecuniary implications
that affect all parties involved, as well as innocent parties who are obligated
to expend time and efforts in furtherance of what the United States has
deemed to be an invalid regulation. Perhaps the greatest of these negative
ramifications is the chilling effect that these regulations, and the ensuing
criminalization, have on deterring these individuals from engaging in future
protests and discouraging others from protesting at all. What is glaringly
obvious is that these costs are unnecessary and contrary to the principles
175. Id.
176. Id. (discussing how Jamie Phillips, Public Policy & Legal Redress Coordinator of the North
Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, and Professor Irving Joyner assisted the NC NAACP's or-
ganization of over 100 volunteer attorneys in surrounding counties to represent Moral Monday arrestees.
Although most of the Moral Monday defendants were represented by these attorneys, some elected to
hire outside attorneys to represent them.).
177. As one of the volunteer attorneys for Moral Monday cases, the author was present during
numerous court dates, only to have those cases continued. Several administrative days were assigned to
simply continue the cases to another administrative date, resulting in countless hours spent in Wake
County District Court without an actual trial. In some cases, the Assistant District Attorney required
attorneys and their clients to remain in the courtroom while other cases were heard, even though it was
apparent that their cases would be continued.
178. Interview with Irving Joyner, supra note 4.
179. Id.
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upon which this country was founded and why the Constitution was
amended to prevent them.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unreasonable governmental attempts to prohibit or limit speech in public
forums, or designated public forums, are indubitably contrary to the Consti-
tution. Individuals must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to speak to
their representatives and voice their concerns. Preventing the exercise of
these First Amendment rights is not only unconstitutional, but ineffective.
As the Moral Monday Movement and similar movements in United States'
history have demonstrated, attempts to prevent and regulate speech - re-
gardless of the rationale for doing so - produce an adverse effect.
When governmental entities have attempted to regulate speech in an ef-
fort to further prevent the act of protesting, and not the message itself, it has
merely rallied more individuals to come together to protest against the enti-
ties that seek to violate their fundamental rights.'80 When the governmental
entities have attempted to regulate the content of the speech by preventing
or limiting the propagation of the protestors' ideologies, it instead results in
the opposite effect and generates more awareness and engages a broader
and larger audience.'8 ' Whatever the rationale for attempting to hinder free
speech, the end result simply does not serve any legitimate governmental
interest.
In addition to the futility of these intrusions upon free speech, the costs
associated with the attempted regulations on speech are onerous and an
inefficient use of taxpayer and personal funds. Entities tasked with enforc-
ing these laws must expend valuable resources to provide the appropriate
support and personnel to implement them. In the event that the entities de-
cide to penalize individuals that refuse to adhere to the constitutionally in-
valid regulations, these costs multiply exponentially in order to process,
arrest and try individuals, as well as defend its regulations. The additional
costs cannot be justified, especially in light of the limited resources that are
available to the agencies that are forced to bear the costs for enforcing
them.1 8 2 Unfortunately, these costs are not borne by the entity alone; indi-
180. Id.
I81. Id.
182. Amanda Lamb & Kelly Gardncr, 'Moral Mondays' forcing changes in Wake arrest procedures,
WRAL (Jun. 25, 2013), http://www.wral.com/-moral-mondays-forcing-changes-in-how-wake-
processes-arrests/I 2594377/#YzXhWUiEiUVOYW7k.99 (discussing the City-County Bureau of Identi-
fication (CCBI), which was an agency forced to change their protocol following the increase of Moral
Monday arrests due to the costs associated with the arrests. According to Sam Pennica, the Director of
CCBI, "with limited funding for overtime, he has to weigh how to best use that funding. 'It's a matter of
dollars and cents and how much money I have to operate CCBI and whether I spend that money on
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viduals must likewise drain valuable resources, and more importantly,
waste precious time in order to protect the liberties so clearly afforded to
them under this democracy and further mandated by the Constitution.
Instead of attempting to prohibit and discourage speech, governmental
entities and elected individuals should welcome an active dialogue with
their constituents. Protest should not be considered a personal affront to
elected officials. As Abraham Lincoln so succinctly stated, this is a gov-
ernment "by the people, for the people." 83 Integral to a democratic society
is a process by which the citizenry can voice concerns to elected officials
without fear of reprisal. The government and its elected officials should
provide regular, meaningful access to individuals to hear their concerns and
to use those forums to further enhance democracy.
Elected officials have a crucial responsibility and must, at a minimum, be
well-versed on the protections the Constitution affords to individuals. Nei-
ther their title, nor their positions on issues, makes them immune from ac-
countability to the people who elect them. Once elected, the democracy
doesn't revert to a dictatorship; the Court has issued a clear mandate: citi-
zens are entitled to petition the government and their elected officials to
seek redress of their grievances. Often times, elected officials believe that
their successful election, as evidenced by them attaining the majority of
votes, validates their positions, ideals and beliefs, to the exclusion of rights
of the minority. This too, is contrary to the form of government that United
States citizens enjoy and value. For example, during the Civil Rights
Movement, the majority of voters in many southern states elected candi-
dates who held specific views. However, once elected, the elected officials
became a representative of all people, not just those that supported them.
All citizens are thus entitled to equal access to petition their elected offi-
cials. When this access is provided, it reduces conflict, allows for a mean-
ingful exchange and enables the valuable discourse that is necessary for the
egalitarian society to thrive. The paradigm must shift back to the fundamen-
tal values upon which this nation was founded and the laws enacted to safe-
guard them.
Protest should be encouraged; however, policies are also vital to ensure
that protests do not exceed what is allowable. Regulations should be appro-
priate to prevent abuse, but not excessively restrictive so as to stifle or pro-
hibit speech. Current rules that unnecessarily prohibit or restrict the "free
fingerprinting and photographing someone who's arrcsted for trespassing, or do I pay an investigator
overtime to work a homicide? Those are the decisions we have to make."').
183. President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
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flow . . . of ideas"1 84 should be abolished and replaced with rules that are
consistent with time, place, and manner restrictions that are indifferent to
the views expressed and that are reasonable to protect the safety of others
and the efficiency of the governmental process. These new rules should be
transparent, reasonable, fair, and equally applied, regardless of the message
or the speaker. Similar to the organizers of the Moral Monday Movements,
governmental entities should also anticipate protest and issues related to
protest, and in addition to establishing rules, should provide guidance and
training to its staff that will allow them to prepare and appropriately re-
spond to protestors so that their actions do not run afoul of the Constitution.
Finally, peaceful protest should never be criminalized. The least restric-
tive penalties should be imposed against individuals that violate reasonable
regulations established for protesting. In lieu of arrest, protestors should be
issued warnings, tickets or fines. Protestors should be provided with proper
guidance on what activity is permitted and when it is allowed. If protestors
violate rules, they should be given instructions on what they can do to com-
ply with the rules. If it is ever necessary to penalize individuals for violating
appropriate regulations involving free speech, the entities should establish
objective, articulate, measurable standards to determine when the rules have
been violated.
Although enacted over two centuries ago,'85 repeated challenges to the
First Amendment have continued to yield the same result: the First
Amendment still reigns supreme. As Professor Joyner aptly stated, "[t]he
Constitution has to prevail. Just as lobbyists are granted access to represent-
atives, so too, should the people. Government and elected officials have an
obligation to accommodate that." 86 The government must acknowledge
what the United States Supreme Court has consistently held; the fundamen-
tal rights of freedom of speech, to peaceably assemble and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances must be regarded as paramount and
its continued protection revered with the greatest sanctity. 87
184. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Radio Address to the New York "Hcrald Tribune" Forum
(Oct. 24, 1940).("Thc constant free flow of communication amount us-cnabling the free interchange of
ideas-forms the very bloodstream of our nation. It keeps the mind and body of our democracy cternally
vital, eternally young.").
185. U.S. CONST. amend. I (discussing the date of enactment on Dec. 17, 1791).
186. Interview with Irving Joyner, supra note 4.
187. See generally Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2011) ("It was not
by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guar-
anty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances.").
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